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I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg' involved a freeze-out
merger of the First American Bank of Virginia ("Bank") with
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. ("VBI"), a wholly owned subsidiary of
First American Bankshares, Inc. ("FABI"). In executing the merger,
the executive board of the Bank approved a price of $42 per share
for the minority shareholders who would lose their interests in the
Bank as a result of the merger. Bank directors solicited proxies for
the transaction stating, among other things, that the plan had been
approved because of its opportunity for the shareholders to receive
a "high" value for their shares. Sandberg, a minority shareholder, did
not send in her proxy, but instead filed an action in district court
alleging that the defendants solicited proxies by means of materially
false or misleading proxy materials. The Court held that knowingly
false statements of reasons, opinions, or belief, may be actionable
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 even if
couched in conclusory terms; and second, in a decision from which
four justices dissented, that a minority shareholder cannot show
causation of damages compensable under § 14(a) if the majority does
not need minority votes to approve the transaction. In arriving at its
second holding, the Court was unable to find any manifestation of
congressional intent to protect the shareholders who lost their
I l11 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
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interests in the freeze-out merger. In the face of what it determined
to be impractical consequences and the threat of speculative claims
and hazy issues in litigation, the Court declined the invitation to
expand the private cause of action for shareholders. Instead, by
"rounding out the scope of an implied private statutory right of action
[the Court] looked to policy reasons for deciding where the outer
limits of the right should lie."2 They concluded that the outer limits
stop just short of the minority shareholder.
I. SECTION 14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934: FROM SHAREHOLDER
PROTECTION TO VIRGINIA BANKSHARES
The Securities Exchange Act of 19343 was created to remedy the
inadequacies in the securities market which eventually culminated in
the stock market crash of 1929. A growing sentiment prompted the
enactment; "[ijf investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of
exchanges and corporations alike, the law must advance."4 Among
the chief evils that Congress cited was the "inadequate corporate
reporting which keeps in ignorance of necessary factors ... a public
continually solicited to buy such securities by the sheer advertising
value of listing."5
The resulting legislation encompassed a comprehensive package
with the chief provisions grouped under six headings: (a) control of
credits; (b) control of manipulative practices; (c) provision of
adequate and honest reports to securities holders by registered
corporations; (d) control of unfair practices of corporate insiders; (e)
control of exchanges and over-the-counter markets; and (f) adminis-
tration.6 Section 14(a) was penned under the section entitled
"control of unfair practices of corporate insiders." It "authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules for the solicita-
2 Id at 2764.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
4 H.R. REP. No. 1383: 73d Cong.. 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
5 Id
6 Id
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tion of proxies, and prohibits their violation."7 An implied cause of
action for violation of § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule
14a-9 promulgated thereunder, has long been accepted.8 After that
initial determination, however, inconsistencies emerged as to what
constituted a cause of action tinder the rule. The result was a split
in authority as to the proper test for causation in private shareholder
actions. It was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court addressed the
confusion.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite,9 shareholders of the Electric Auto-
Lite Company asserted that a merger was accomplished through the
use of a materially false and misleading proxy statement. The
plaintiffs brought suit on the day before the shareholders' meeting
where the vote on the merger was to take place. They "sought an
injunction against the voting by management of all proxies obtained
by means of an allegedly misleading proxy solicitation."'" The vote
took place, however, as no temporary restraining order was obtained.
The petitioners amended their complaint several months later
requesting that the merger be set aside and seeking other proper
relief.
The Court reasoned that to allow the fairness of the merger as a
complete defense to liability would be to "insulate from ... redress
an entire category of proxy violations .... ,", [A]nd would "subvert
the congressional purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure to
shareholders."'12  The Court held that "[w]here there has been a
finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing
of [a] causal relationship between the violation and the injury for
which he seeks redress if ... he proves that the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials,
was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction."' 3
7 Virginia Bankshares, Ill S. Ct. 2749.
8 See, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1953); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944): Kroese v. Crawford.
1963 Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,262 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1963): Remar v. Clayton Sec.
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
9 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
0 Id. at 377.
11 Id. at 382.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 385.
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Therefore, the Court concluded that no requirement of proof was
necessary to determine whether the defect actually had a decisive
effect on voting. In its oft-quoted footnote seven, however, the
Supreme Court made it clear that the decision did not apply to those
cases where "the management controls a sufficient number of shares
to approve the transaction without any votes from the minority."' 4
After Mills, much controversy developed regarding whether a
minority shareholder could sustain a cause of action for violations of
§ 14 where the majority was capable of approving the transaction
without the minority shareholders. Several cases, both prior and
subsequent to Mills, addressed this specific issue and the authorities
were split as to the effect of a majority who could approve a pending
transaction without any votes from the minority shareholders. One
view of causation was adopted in Laurenzano v. Einbender.15 In
this case, the plaintiffs, minority shareholders, sued two majority
shareholders under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
alleging, among other theories, that a misleading proxy caused them
damage because it prevented them from suing to enjoin contested
transactions; their case would not have been dismissed from state
court had the proxy solicitation been truthful; and the defendant
directors would not have proceeded with the transactions for fear of
publicity had the proxy material made public the alleged impropri-
eties. In holding for the plaintiffs, the Court said that "[iut is not...
to be assumed without evidence that the solicitation of proxies was
a gratuitous and, therefore, purposeless and legally inert act."16
They found that since the proxy was "calculatedly infused into the
matrix of the transactions; it cannot now be said as a matter of law
that the solicitation was not an integral part of the trans-
actions ... .'17
The Second Circuit found minority shareholders had the right to
seek an injunction to avoid the transaction, or to exercise their
appraisal rights if they refrained from voting their shares'8 and in
14 Id at 385 n.7.
15 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
16 Id at 361.
17 Id
Is See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that
a shareholder maintains her rights to seek appraisal of shares only if she does not assign her
proxies to the majority).
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Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,9 the court stated that the
"broad remedial purpose of the Securities Act"20 must be enlisted
for the "protection of the minority shareholder when he is the most
helpless ....
Although the conclusions of Laurenzano and Schlick were
analogous, there were distinct differences in the facts of each case
which suggest the opinions are vastly dissimilar. In Laurenzano, the
court stated that much of their decision relied upon the facts of the
case.22  For example, there was substantial evidence that the
transaction was self-serving to the directors. The court indicated the
directors were given the opportunity to purchase other stock at large
discounts in return for their agreement to sell control of the corpora-
tion, 23 and the transaction was arranged so that the premium paid
for the directors' controlling interest was paid by charging a premium
for shares to be purchased by the company as part of the same
transaction.- In Schlick, however, the court did not encounter a
transaction that was so blatantly self-serving to the directors. The
language of the court reflected this by adopting a sweeping view of
minority shareholder rights. Citing the "broad remedial purposes" of
the Securities Act, the court determined that the "equities call for
protection of the minority shareholder when he is the most help-
19 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
20 Id. at 383 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
21 Id. at 383.
22 Laurenzano. 264 F. Supp. at 362. Although the court relied heavily on the facts
of the case. the opinion can be read broadly because of the language of the court that says.
among other things:
"[I]t is not legally possible to decide what legal consequences flow from the
informational defects in the meeting by asserting that the meeting would have
ended in the same resolutions no matter what the view of the minority. That
is not necessarily the fact and it cannot be the resolving principle of law."
Id.
2' Id. at 360.
24 Id. at 358. Defendants Dobin and Horne owned 70 percent of the stock of Retail
Centers of the Americas. Inc. (Retail) and served on the board of directors. They agreed
to sell a bare majority of the outstanding shares to National Industries, Inc. (National) in
order to give National voting control over Retail. By exercising its control over Retail.
National paid the premium for the defendant's control-stock by paying out of Retail's assets.
and sold stock to Retail at an excessive price recouping its cash outlay.
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less .... "25 Hence, although the extent to which a minority
shareholder is protected may be subject to further interpretation, it is
apparent that when interpreting the congressional intent of the
Securities Act and the Supreme Court decision in Mills, the Second
Circuit concluded that minority shareholders were the class of
persons intended to be protected.
In Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products,26 the Eighth Circuit
concluded that "the ability to effectuate a corporate action indepen-
dently of the votes of the minority shareholders does not insulate a
company from a materially false or misleading proxy statement.
21
Similarly, in Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc.,' the
Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Mills as
meaning that "causation and reliance are no longer factually-to-be
proven predicates to recovery"29 and all that must be shown is the
materiality of the misstatement or omission. In a concurring opinion,
Circuit Judge Sprecher cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States30 as support for a
broad theory of causation. "Under the 'obligation to disclose'
standard of Affiliated Ute, the withholding of a material fact or
facts... established the requisite element of causation in fact."3
This theory of causation is available regardless of the control of the
shares because "[tihe fiduciary relation exists whether the dominant
and controlling shareholder controls through a 5% stock interest or
a 95% interest. '32  Furthermore, Judge Sprecher stated in no
uncertain terms that "causation should be conclusively established by
the mere solicitation of votes whether or not management controls a
sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction without votes
from the minority. To hold otherwise makes a mockery of the
2 Schlick, 507 F.2d at 383.
2 597 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id at 638.
2S 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
29 Id at 520.
30 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
31 Swanson, 475 F.2d at 523 (Sprecher, J., concurring in the result but dissenting
from the remedy upon remand).
32 Id
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securities acts."33 However, the extreme view that Judge Sprecher
espoused is not commonly accepted, and rests on the notion of
fiduciary duty. Because it rests upon the directors' fiduciary duty,
such a cause of action would not fall within the ambit of § 14(a), and
was beyond the scope of the plaintiff's case in Swanson.
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware read
a broad causation requirement into § 14(a) in Jacobs v. Hanson.'
Although the defendants held enough of the shares to effectuate the
transaction, the court found it significant that the defendants waited
until all the minority votes were cast at the shareholder meeting and
then cast their votes with the majority of the minority. This course
was chosen out of fear of future lawsuits, and thus the court
determined a trier of fact could conclude a majority of the shares
would not have been cast in favor of the challenged sales had it not
been for the misstatements and omissions. Furthermore, the court
felt that the minority shareholders could have successfully secured an
injunction barring the challenged transactions had they possessed all
available information.
In contrast, the strict view of causation was illustrated in Barnet
v. Anaconda Co." Plaintiff was a minority shareholder in a
Delaware corporation, Wire and Cable, which was later dissolved.
Prior to its dissolution, more than 73% of Wire and Cable's stock
was owned by defendant Anaconda. An agreement was reached by
which certain transactions were to take place pending approval by
shareholders holding two-thirds of the Wire and Cable shares.
Success was a foregone conclusion since Anaconda owned 73% of
those shares. The shareholder meeting took place and the agreement
was approved. Following the dissolution of Wire and Cable,
minority shareholders brought an action alleging a plan and scheme
designed by the directors to acquire the assets of Wire and Cable for
inadequate consideration and to deprive the minority shareholders of
their statutory remedy of appraisal rights. Plaintiffs further alleged
33 Id. at 524. Judge Sprecher went as far as to suggest that if a quantitative test were
adopted, the more appropriate one would be that "the greater the percentage of control by
the controlling shareholder, the greater the protection required for the minority sharehold-
ers." Id.
.W 464 F. Supp. 777 (D. Del. 1979).
" 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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that a misleading proxy which omitted material facts was utilized to
help implement the scheme. The court held that plaintiffs failed to
state a claim under the Act because the "necessary causal connection
between the alleged violation of § 14(a) and the alleged injury to the
minority stockholders [was] wholly lacking"36 since Anaconda
owned 73% of the corporation's outstanding capital stock and
required only a two-thirds majority vote to effectuate the merger. In
other words, the court held, the "'but-for' element -- the element of
causation -- [did] not and, indeed, could not exist. The transactions
under attack did not result from the issuance of the allegedly
misleading proxy material .... 1"7 Quoting the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, the court noted that there could be civil liability
"only if [one's] law violation causes another harm of the sort which
it was the presumed intention of the Legislature to protect against
and that injury occurred in a way proscribed by the statute."3
In Adair v. Schneider,39 the court held that as a matter of law
no violation of § 10(b) could be shown since the deceptive proxy did
not cause the damage alleged.4" The corporation issued the proxy
material in an attempt to change the articles of incorporation of the
company. In order to do so, a majority vote was required. Since the
defendants controlled the majority, the court opined that "[tihe
'deception' was 'immaterial to a breach of the duties imposed under
common law principles."' 4
It was not until Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg42 that the
Supreme Court specifically addressed the question left open in
footnote seven of the Mills decision. Virginia Bankshares involved
a "freeze-out" merger where the First American Bank of Virginia
("Bank") was eventually merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
("VBI"), a wholly owned subsidiary of First American Bankshares,
36 Id. at 773.
37 Id at 771.
38 Id at 772 (citing Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947) (footnotes
omitted)).
39 293 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
40 Id. at 396. Although the case involved a misleading proxy solicitation, it was not
decided within the ambit of § 14(a) because the company involved was an insurance
company regulated by New York law.
41 Id at 396 (quoting O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1964)).
42 111 S. Ct. 2749.
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Inc. ("FABI"). VBI owned approximately 85% of the outstanding
shares of the Bank. The remaining 15% was held by some two
thousand minority shareholders, whose interest in the Bank would be
lost in the merger. KBW determined that $42 a share would be a
fair price for the minority stock. The directors elected to solicit
proxies for the merger proposal even though Virginia law required
only that the proposal be submitted to a vote at a shareholders
meeting with the meeting preceded by a statement of information to
the shareholders. The proxy stated that the minority should adopt the
merger plan because of its opportunity for the minority shareholders
to achieve a "high value" and "fair price" for their stock.
Most minority shareholders gave the proxies requested and the
merger was approved. Respondent Sandberg did not give up her
proxies, but instead brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, pleading two counts: One
for soliciting proxies in violation of § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, and the
other for breach of fiduciary duties owed to the minority sharehold-
ers. Sandberg alleged under count one that the directors did not
believe the price offered or the terms of the merger were fair, but
merely said so because they had no alternative if they wanted to
remain on the board.43
The jury returned verdicts for Sandberg on both counts awarding
her an additional $18 per share representing the difference from what
she would have received had the stock been valued adequately. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgments holding that the misrepresentations were material and
respondents could maintain their action even though their votes were
not needed to effectuate the merger.' In so holding, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.a5 whereby "if the proxy statement
contained material misrepresentations and was an essential link in the
merger, § 14(a) liability may be established."'
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court rendered a two part
43 Count two, regarding the breach of fiduciary duty, was not discussed in the
Supreme Court opinion, and is therefore beyond the scope of this article.
44 Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989).
45 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
4 Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1121.
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opinion"7 where it considered "whether causation of damages
compensable through the implied private right of action under
§ 14(a) [could] be demonstrated by a member of a class of minority
shareholders whose votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw
to authorize the transaction giving rise to the claim.""8 Citing their
decision in Mills, the Court noted that causation could be shown if
the proxy solicitation is an "essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction.
49
The Court rested its decision upon a lack of conclusive congres-
sional intent stating that the "recognition of any private right of
action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congres-
sional intent to provide a remedy" 50 and it "[could] find no manifes-
tation of intent to recognize a cause of action as broad as that which
respondent's theory of causation would entail."'"
The Supreme Court went on to reject the respondents' theory that
a desire to avoid minority shareholders' ill will should suffice to
justify recognizing the requisite causality of a proxy statement
needed to garner the minority shareholders' support. In the majori-
ty's view, this theory "would turn on inferences about what the
corporate directors would have thought and done without the
minority shareholder approval needed to authorize action 52 thus
rendering the issues hazy and their resolution unreliable.
In the final part of its decision, the Court rejected respondents'
theory of causality derived from the requirements of Virginia law
dealing with post-merger ratification. The respondents' theory was
that whenever a false or misleading proxy resulted in* the loss of a
state right, such as an appraisal remedy or enjoining the transaction,
a federal remedy should be provided. The majority concluded that
there could be no loss of a state remedy since the minority votes
47 In the first part of its opinion the Supreme Court held that knowingly false or
misleadingly incomplete statements of opinion, reasons or belief may be actionable, even
when in conclusory terms, however, this part of the decision is beyond the scope of this
article.
48 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2761.
49 Id at 2762.
50 Id at 2763.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 2765.
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were inadequate to ratify the merger under state law.53
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, noted that the majority
opinion disallowed an action against directors for the misrepresenta-
tion of beliefs, a result totally inconsistent with modem tort law.
However, he welcomed this departure since, in his view, the federal
cause of action at issue was never enacted by Congress, and
therefore, should be kept as narrow as possible.
Justices Stevens and Marshall joined in an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. Their main point of contention was in
Section III of the opinion which dealt with the causation of the
respondents' damages. Citing the critical test developed in Mills,4
they determined it was not an "unwarranted extension of the Mills
rationale to conclude that because management found it necessary,
whether for 'legal or practical reasons', to solicit proxies from
minority shareholders to obtain their approval of the merger, that
solicitation was 'an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction. ' '5 5  In the dissenting portion of the opinion, Justice
Stevens read the causation requirement in Mills so broadly as to
allow a cause of action for damages under § 14(a) whenever
materially false or misleading statements are made in a proxy
statement, regardless of the reasons for the solicitation.
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
These four justicies disagreed with the majority on that portion of the
majority opinion regarding the proof of causation required to
establish a violation of § 14(a). While acknowledging that caution
should be exercised in creating a private right of action and that
congressional intent should be adhered to closely, the Justices read
Mills as not purporting to limit the scope of private actions. In fact,
they noted that footnote seven of Mills indicated that some courts
had applied non-voting causation theories for at least the past twenty-
53 Id at 2766.
5 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (holding that where there has
been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal
relationship.. . if... he proves that the proxy statement itself rather than the particular
defect in the solicitation materials was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction (emphasis added)).
55 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2768 (Stevens, J. and Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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five years.56
Turning to the record of the case before them, the dissent noted
that First American Bankshares, Inc. ("FABI") and Virginia Bank-
shares, Inc. ("VBI") retained the option to back out of the transaction
if dissatisfied with the reaction of the minority, and that in fact, only
a year prior to this transaction FABI had failed in an attempted
freeze-out merger that was almost identical to the VBI merger.
5 7
Justice Kennedy stated that "[tihe Court's description does not fit this
case58 and is not a sound objection in any event."'59  In addition,
Justice Kennedy noted that management had expressed concern that
the transaction not result in loss of support for the bank in the
community, and that FABI sought a favorable response from
minority shareholders.' He argued that, contrary to the majority
opinion, this case "demonstrates that nonvoting causation theories are
quite plausible where the misstatement or omission is material and
the damage sustained by the minority shareholders is serious. '"61
Finally, in response to the majority claim that the minority could
show no loss of state remedies since the minority votes were
inadequate to ratify the merger, Justice Kennedy points out that the
majority theory "requires us to conclude that the Virginia statute...
incorporates the same definition of materiality as the federal proxy
rules, '62 a conclusion for which no support could be found. It
follows that if Virginia law incorporated a test of materiality that was
different from the federal standard, the plaintiffs could still be able
56 Id at 2770 (Kennedy, I., Blackmun, J., Marshall, J. and Stevens. J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
57 Id. at 2772. In that merger the investment banking firm of Keefe. Bruyette &
Woods ("KBW") had been retained for the transaction as well. The Maryland subsidiary's
board of directors had retained its own advisor and concluded that the price offered by FABI
was inadequate. The transaction failed when the directors refused to proceed despite the
minority's inability to outvote FABI.
53 This is a point that the majority apparently conceded when they wrote that
"[riespondents' burden to justify recognition of causation beyond the scope of Mills must
be addressed not by emphasizing the instant case but by confronting the risk inherent in the
cases that could be expected to be characteristic if the causal theory were adopted."
Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765 n.12.
Id at 2771 (Kennedy, J., Marshall, J.. Blackmun, .. and Stevens, J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
61 Id. at 2772.
62 Id. at 2773.
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to show a cause of action under the state standard.
The Supreme Court, with the exception of Justice Scalia, was in
agreement as to the first holding of the court:63 That a statement
couched in conclusory terms purporting to explain directors' reasons
for recommending certain corporate action can be materially
misleading within the meaning of Rule 14a-9. As for the second
holding: That causation cannot be shown by a minority shareholder
whose votes are not required to authorize the transaction, the vote
was five to four, far from an overwhelming majority.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF
SECTION 14(a) SUPPORTS A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
A slim majority of the Supreme Court argued that absent a clear
indication from Congress, they were unable to conclude that the
implied private right of action to deter violations of § 14(a) extends
to situations where the minority vote is unable to affect the transac-
tion, especially in light of the fact that Congress expressly provided
private rights of action in other sections of the Securities Act.'
However, this argument addresses the propriety of recognizing an
implied private right of action for a shareholder in any situation not
just in the context of minority shareholders. Taken to its logical
conclusion, a private right of action could never lie unless specifical-
ly enumerated by Congress under the majority's theory. Yet private
rights of action for violations of § 14(a) have been recognized
universally since the Supreme Court case of J.L Case Co. v.
Borak65 and later in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite6 where the Court
noted that "§ 14(a) stemmed from a congressional belief that 'fair
corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every
equity security bought on a public exchange. '"'67 Therefore, Justice
3 Id at 2767 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6 Id. at 2764 ("Congress expressly provided private rights of action in §§ 9(e), 16(b)
and 18(a) of the same Act").
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
396 U.S. 380 (1969).
67 Idat 381.
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Kennedy reasoned "[wihere an implied cause of action is well
accepted by our own cases and has become an established part of the
securities laws.., we should enforce it as a meaningful remedy
unless we are to eliminate it altogether.""
The implied private right of action under § 14(a) is not only
supported by the congressional intent of the Securities Act, but
indeed, the rationale is heightened in the situation of minority
shareholders whose votes are not required to ratify a corporate
transaction. These shareholders are the most vulnerable to the
decisions of the majority. This vulnerability is most potent when the
transaction at issue will materially alter the structure of the corpora-
tion, and hence, the investment of the shareholder. The broad
purpose of the legislation was to protect investors and depositors69 ,
to regulate the stock exchanges and to monitor the relationship
between the investing public and corporations which invite public
investment by listing on such exchanges.7' Further, Congress noted
that the drastic change that occurred in the method of doing business
was not accompanied by a change in the rules and regulations of
business. Since ownership and control were largely divorced, it
became, in their view, "a condition of the very stability of society
that its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect
[the] ordinary citizen's dependent position.'M Hence, Congress was
well aware of the danger that existed should this fragile economy lay
in the hands of individuals who wield the power of thousands
without personal responsibility.' One of the primary defects
that Congress sought to remedy in the Securities Act of 1934 was the
lack of informed decision making on the part of shareholders. 73 It
was this goal in which the stock exchange is particularly interested.
The exchange was developed specifically to protect the small
investor. "The primary object of the exchange is to afford facilities
for trading in securities under the safest and fairest conditions
- Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2769 (Kennedy, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.
and Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
70 Id. at 4.
7' Idat6.
72 Id
73 H.R. REP. No. 1711. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
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attainable"'74 so that parties would be trading on information that is,
to the extent possible, the same as for all others. Thus, when
discussing the general scope of the bill, it was clear that the use of
all kinds of manipulative practices on national exchanges was to be
banned., These manipulative practices specifically included "[flalse
and misleading statements designed to induce investors to buy when
they should sell and to sell when they should buy. .. ."75 They
stated that "the next object in order of importance has become 'to
give [] stockholders, in understandable form, such information...
as will avoid misleading them in any respect and as will put them in
possession of all information needed ... to determine the true value
of their investments.' 76 Congress observed that the idea of the free
and open public market is dependent upon true and accurate
information. "The hiding and secreting of important information
obstructs the operations of the market as indices of real value"'
while "the disclosure of information materially important to investors
may not instantaneously be reflected in market value, but ... truth
does eventually find relatively quick acceptance on the market."7
By all accounts, it is this truth that Congress was concerned with
when they devised § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.79 It was their concern that the economy was so tightly
connected with the market system that a free flow of information was
vital not only to that system, but to the entire economy. They stated
that "it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that
its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect the
ordinary citizen's dependent position"80 and that private regulation
was incapable of guaranteeing either recognition or protection.
Congress noted that:
[Tihe leaders of private business.., have not since the war
been able to act to protect themselves by compelling a
continuous and orderly program of change in methods and
74 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
75 Id at 12.
76 Id at 14.
77 Id at 13.
78 Id
7 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
SH.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
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standards of doing business .... The repetition in the
summer of 1933 of the blindness and abuses of 1929 has
convinced a patient public that enlightened self-interest in
private leadership is not sufficiently powerful to effect the
necessary changes along.*. . that private leadership seeking
to make changes must be given Government help and protec-
tion.8'
There is also substantial evidence in the legislative history that
minority shareholders were intended to be protected from unlawful
acts of the majority, even to the extent of allowing a private action
to redress damages. In addressing the need for legislation to require
disclosure of pertinent information and other protections to stock-
holders, Congress expressed concern over instances where "a
shareholder will remain a shareholder in the company, under a new
management which he has helped to install without knowing whether
it will be good or bad for the company." 2  Although this bill
addressed problems related to the cash tender offer, or "takeover
bid," its concerns are analogous to those in the solicitation of
materially misleading proxies because both situations hinge upon a
lack of accurate information upon which the shareholder must act.
In addition, the bill is designed to fill the gap in current securities
law by requiring certain disclosures "if the purpose of the acquisition
is to acquire control of the company, any plans to liquidate the
company, sell its assets, merge it with another company, or make
major changes in its business or corporate structure." 3  Their
concern stemmed from the severe limitation of information that
shareholders were given. The shareholder "is forced to take a
chance. For no matter what he does, he does it without adequate
information to enable him to decide rationally what is the best
possible course of action. This is precisely the kind of dilemma
which our Federal securities laws are designed to prevent. '
Similarly, the bill provides that "[t]he disclosures required by the
proxy rules should be made .... Even if the controlling interest
91 Id. at 4-5.
82 H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.. 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
83 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at3.
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consists of a majority of the outstanding shares so that there would
be no need to solicit proxies from other shareholders to obtain a
majority of the votes. .... ,,85 By including such a requirement,
Congress recognized that the proxy rules provide "a valuable and
important means of furnishing to investors material information about
their company ."..."86
The congressional desire to protect minority shareholders is
evident in other areas as well. When discussing § 14(a), the stated
goal was to eliminate the "evasions, suppressions, distortions,
exaggerations, and outright misrepresentations practiced by some
corporations with intent to cloak their operations and to present to
the investing public a false or misleading appearance as to their
financial appearance.""7 It was further contemplated that the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission would act to protect
the investing public from "promiscuous solicitation of their prox-
ies . . . by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain control
of management. . ."88 Also persuasive is the fact that the minori-
ty of congressmen opposing the act objected to the requirement for
information which goes into great detail as to the management of the
corporation and, most importantly, to the perception that "[a]ny
person who makes a false or misleading statement with regard to any
material fact is liable to a suit for damages by anyone who suf-
fers. .... " Although the courts have never construed a limitless
notion of liability,9 the statement is persuasive authority that
85 Id at 5.
a Idat6.
87 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
Be Id
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1934) (emphasis added).
o See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Here minority
shareholders contested a "short form" merger in which Santa Fe Industries acquired 95% of
another company (Kirby) and offered the minority shareholders $150 per share. The
Supreme Court determined that only conduct involving manipulation or deception is reached
by § 10(b), that the Kirby merger was neither deceptive nor manipulative, and that the
federal law should not quickly be expanded to deal with the law of corporations, especially
where there exists an established policy of corporate regulation.
Although this case clearly states that the securities laws must be expanded cautiously,
it also described the fundamental purpose of the act as "implementing a 'philosophy of full
disclosure'." fit at 478. In any event, it is clearly distinguishable from the situation in
Virginia Bankshares. In Santa Fe the Court noted that it was unwilling to extend the scope
of the statute to encompass fraud and fiduciary duty when the language clearly speaks only
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Congress was aware of the breadth of the action they were providing.
The Congressional Record is replete with language that suggests
a broad purpose to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However,
a great deal of insight into the congressional mind may also be
gained by examination of the cases that were decided prior to and
during the congressional debates.91 In Wagner Electric Corp. v.
Hydraulic Brake Co.,92 the Michigan Supreme Court stated "the
right of a stockholder to maintain an action does not depend upon the
amount of his capital stock holdings, but upon the conduct of the
affairs of the corporation ... ' Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Alabama in Gettinger v. Heaney' stated that:
"[W]here the facts disclose a scheme on the part of the
of manipulation and deception. Hence, an action would lie only if the transaction was
deceptive or manipulative. The Court determined that the transaction in question was
neither deceptive nor manipulative. In contrast, the Virginia Bankshares's Court specifically
found that the directors were in violation of § 14(a) by including materially false and
misleading statements in proxy materials. Furthermore, the Court in Santa Fe chose to defer
to the state remedies that were available to the minority shareholders. The Court noted that
the minority shareholders in Santa Fe had the option of refusing the majority's offer and
seeking appraisal shares. This option was unavailable to the minority shareholders in
Virginia Bankshares. Id.
91 See, e.g., Wile v. Burns Bros., 265 N.Y.S. 461 (App. Div. 1933) (holding that if
persons who act in a representative capacity put themselves in a position antagonistic to the
interests of those whom they represent, minority shareholders are permitted to bring action
to enjoin). See also Wellington Bull & Co. v. Morris, 230 N.Y.S. 122 (App. Div. 1928)
(dealing with stockholder estopped from challenging transaction when its proxy was voted
to approve transaction since the evidence did not indicate fraudulent scheme or collusion):
cf.: Whitehead v. Farmers' Fire & Lightning Mutual Ins., 60 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App.
1933) (noting that single stockholder may maintain equity suit to restrain ultra vires act or
breach of trust by directors or to redress wrongful act, irrespective of loss to corporation);
Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 170 N.E. 917 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that a
minority shareholder cannot interfere with the management of the corporation unless he can
show a breach of trust on which his cause of action rests, such as the trustees act
dishonestly and outside discretionary powers).
9 257 N.W. 884 (Mich. 1934).
93 Id at 886. The Court based its decision upon the notion that the owner of the
controlling interest, Bendix Aviation Corporation in this case, stands in a fiduciary relation
to its stockholders and must act in their interest. The Court did note that if the owners of
a great majority of the capital stock of a corporation are satisfied with the conduct of affairs.
the court must carefully scrutinize the facts before enjoining the action. However, taken in
conjunction with the fiduciary requirements imposed upon directors, it follows that the
satisfaction of the majority is dependent upon truthful disclosure of information.
127 So. 195 (Ala. 1930).
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directors or a majority shareholder... and the board of
directors... may be deprived of their power, 'when by
fraud, conspiracy, or covinous conduct, or extreme misman-
agement, the rights of the minority stockholders are put in
imminent peril and the underlying original corporate entente
cordiale is unfairly destroyed', 9
the majority stockholder is entitled to the appointment of a receiver
to protect her interests.
Until Virginia Bankshares the Supreme Court's reading of the
Securities Act and § 14 were consistent with the expansive view of
congressional intent. The Court stated that "under Rule 14a-9 we are
guided... by the recognition,.. of the Rule's broad remedial
purpose. That purpose is not merely to ensure by judicial means that
the transaction... is fair and otherwise adequate, but to ensure
disclosures by corporate management in order to enable shareholders
to make an informed choice."9 The recognition of such a broad
disclosure policy is not without limits. The limits were defined in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite.97 There the Court determined that the
boundary should be set to avoid a cause of action that could be
established "by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the
transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of the defect
or imposition of liability would not further the interests protected by
§ 14(a)." ' Hence, it was by setting a high standard of materiality
that the Court sought to avoid an avalanche of litigation aimed at
corporations for insignificant omissions or misstatements, not through
the use of artificially narrow causation theories." A broad interpre-
tation of the Act, such as found in Mills and TSC Industries is
entirely consistent with the view that the rules must be interpreted
broadly enough to protect those for whom they were designed.
9S Id at 198.
TSC Ind. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976). The Court stated that "[i]n
defining materiality under Rule 14a-9, we are, of course, giving content to a rule
promulgated by the SEC pursuant to broad statutory authority to promote 'the public
interest' and 'the protection of investors'." Id. at 449 n.1O.
97 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
98 Mills, 396 U.S. at 384.
See, e.g., TSC Ind, 426 U.S. at 448.
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IV. THE COURT'S DECISION DEPRIVES THE MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
UNDER VIRGINIA LAW
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court held that the respondent was unable to show any loss of a state
cause of action, and thus the Court did not have to decide whether
§ 14(a) provides a cause of action for lost state remedies. The
shareholders argued that by relying on the false and misleading proxy
they were induced to vote in favor of the transaction thereby
forfeiting a state law right to an appraisal remedy, or failing to seek
to enjoin the transaction.
Addressing the appraisal rights, the Court noted that Virginia law
specifically excludes dissenting shareholders in a bank merger from
seeking appraisal shares, and therefore, there was no loss of this
"solitary remedy."'"o  However, by referring to the appraisal rights
as the minority shareholders' only available remedy, the Court
ignored their right under state or federal law to seek to enjoin the
transaction. In fact, several cases have held that causation of
damages to a minority shareholder could be shown with the loss of
the opportunity to seek an injunction.' One court has even gone
100 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766 n. 14. In examining other parts of the
majority's decision, one wonders if this case would have been decided differently had it not
involved a bank merger. In any event, reliance upon this law, which is unique to Virginia.
is inconsistent with the rationale previously espoused by the majority when Justice Souter
stated that "[rlespondents' burden . . . must be addressed . . . by confronting the risk
inherent in the cases that could be expected to be characteristic if the causal theory were
adopted." Id. at 2765 n.12. Because the majority opinion was designed with the broad
spectrum of possible cases in mind, it follows that the portion of their decision involving
loss of state remedies is only applicable in those very rare instances when the shareholder's
statutory right to appraisal remedies is precluded by state law.
101 See, e.g., Cole v. Schenley Indus., 563 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1977); Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1970); Jacobs v.
Hanson, 464 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Del. 1979). See also William H. Painter, Civil Liability
Under the Federal Proxy Rules, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 425, 448 (1986); Stephen R. Munzer.
Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 118-120
(1970) (discussing the availability of injunctions or declaratory judgments on two grounds:
if the shareholder were aware of the proxy before the shareholders meeting he may have
been able to block the transaction, and if the shareholder were unable to obtain an injunction
based on a violation of state law that had been concealed).
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so far as to hold that causation existed because the plaintiffs, when
they sued in state court to enjoin the transaction, "were dismissed as
they would not have been if the proxy statement had been truth-
ful."'0 2 By failing to adequately respond to the shareholders' loss
of the injunction remedy, the Supreme Court, in effect, ignored an
entire realm of possible damage that could be caused by proxy
materials that are materially false or contain omissions. Moreover,
these losses can occur to a minority shareholder regardless of the
voting power of the majority.
A board of directors must submit for shareholder approval any
plan for merger or share exchange under Virginia law.0 3 There-
fore, the directors in the present case had an obligation under state
law to put the planned merger to the vote of the shareholders. The
Fourth Circuit argued that because there was such a requirement
under state law it was "conceded that the proxy statement was, under
Virginia law, an essential link for accomplishing the merger"1" and
therefore met the standard of causation in Mills. Although the
minority shareholders in this case did not have access to appraisal
rights under Virginia law, they were entitled to vote on the proposed
merger, and the board of directors was required to notify them about
the proposed merger. The board chose to fulfill their state law
102 Laurenzano, 264 F. Supp. at 360.
103 Virginia Stock Corporation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718. The statute says in
relevant part:
A. After adopting a plan of merger or share exchange, the board of directors of
each corporation party to the merger, and the board of directors of the
corporation of all of whose outstanding shares of any class or series will be
acquired in the share exchange, shall submit the plan of merger... or share
exchange for approval by its shareholders.
B. For a plan of merger or share exchange to be approved:
1. The board of directors shall recommend the plan of merger or share
exchange to the shareholders unless the board of directors determines that
because of conflict of interests or other special circumstances it should make
no recommendation and communicates the basis for its determination to the
shareholders with the plan; and ....
D. The corporation shall notify each shareholder, whether or not entitled to vote,
of the proposed shareholder's meeting .... The notice shall also state that
the purpose. or one of the purposes, of the meeting is to consider the plan of
merger or share exchange and contain or be accompanied by a copy of the
plan.
(emphasis added).
,04 Sandberg. 891 F.2d at 1120 n.I.
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obligation of notifying the shareholders by proxy. Thus, by
including material misstatements or omissions, the board acted in
violation of Virginia law and the shareholders were entitled to a state
law cause of action for violation of the requirements for merger or
share exchange. Although it may be argued that the minority
shareholders did not have sufficient votes to defeat the proposed
merger, therefore no causal connection existed, the argument does
not extend to the state law claim for two reasons. First, such a
theory assumes that the standard of causation is the same in a state
law cause of action as it is for the federal cause of action. There is
nothing to suggest that this is the case. Second, Virginia Code
§ 13.1-718(D) specifically states that the corporation shall notify
every shareholder, whether or not they are entitled to vote. By
including those shareholders that have no right to vote, the legislature
is signalling to the courts that all shareholders are entitled to accurate
information regarding the corporation's major transactions. This
vested right of shareholders exists regardless of their ability to
disapprove the transaction. Therefore, it is clear that under state law
the shareholders should have been entitled to bring an action for
violation of § 13.1-718. Since they were unable to do so, the proxy
material resulted in their loss of a state law remedy.
The majority's final analysis concluded that, even assuming that
the proxy solicitation was misleading, the Virginia statutes indicate
that a minority shareholder would have no cause of action because
the minority votes were inadequate to ratify the merger under state
law. In support of this contention they cited Va. Code § 13.1-
691(A)(2)(1989), which prevents a shareholder "from seeking to
avoid a transaction tainted by a director's conflict if, inter alia, the
minority shareholders ratified the transaction following disclosure of
the material facts of the transaction and the conflict."' 5 However,
ratification of a tainted transaction is not analogous to the situation
presented by the case before the Court. In this case, there was never
a meaningful opportunity for the minority shareholders to ratify the
transaction because the proxy solicitations contained materially
misstated facts. Furthermore, the majority's logic assumes that "the
Virginia statute governing director conflicts of interest ... incorpo-
105 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766 (emphasis added).
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rates the same definition of materiality as the federal proxy
rules."'06  Although the majority acknowledges this point, they
dismiss it saying only that the respondents present nothing to suggest
that there is such a difference." 7
In any event, this question alone should have warranted a remand
to determine the proper standard of materiality under Virginia law.
As Justice Kennedy stated in his dissenting opinion:
In all events, the theory that the merger would have been
voidable absent minority shareholder approval is far more
speculative than the theory that FABI and the Bank would
have called off the transaction .... Here again, the difficulty
of knowing what would have happened in the hypothetical
universe of full disclosure suggests that we should "resolve
doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect" in
order to "effectuate the congressional policy of ensuring that
the shareholders are able to make an informed choice when
they are consulted on corporate transactions.
0 8
The Court obviously could not, as a matter of law, say that the
minority shareholders lost no cause of action under state law.
V. VIRGINIA BANKSHARES AND THE FUTURE
FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Having concluded that the minority shareholders in Virginia
Bankshares were unable to show how the proxy material caused them
any loss, it would seem that the Supreme Court has effectively shut
the courtroom door to the entire ambit of shareholders whose vote is
unnecessary to complete a transaction. However, it is premature to
place such an emphasis on the decision of the Court.
It is clear that Virginia Bankshares is a narrow case and is
limited to its facts, or at least to a very narrow set of facts. In the
majority's opinion Justice Souter said "[rlespondents do not claim
106 Id. at 2773 (Kennedy. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
107 Id. at 2766 n.13.
,08 Id. at 2773 (Kennedy. J concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that any other application of a theory of lost state remedies would
avail them"109 and went on to show how any claim that a minority
shareholder might have for appraisal remedies is precluded since
"dissenting stockholders in bank mergers do not even have this
solitary remedy available to them"" 0 under Virginia law. There-
fore, when the court says that "[t]his case does not ... require us to
decide whether § 14(a) provides a cause of action for lost state
remedies, since there is no indication in the law or facts before us
that the proxy solicitation resulted in any such loss,""' it is clear
that the Court intends for the holding to only apply in the rare case
where a minority shareholder has no right to seek appraisal remedies
or other state law remedies.
Subsequent cases interpreting the Court's decision are equally
mixed. In Wilson v. Great American Indus.,1 2 the Northern
District of New York was faced with a set of facts that were
seemingly analogous to those in Virginia Bankshares. A merger was
planned between two corporations, defendant Great American
Industries, Inc. ("GA") and defendant Chenango Industries, Inc.
("Chenango"). Plaintiff was a minority shareholder of Chenango
who filed a claim for a misleading proxy. The case had previously
been decided by the Second Circuit" 3 and after a hearing on
damages, the plaintiff class was awarded $776,000 with interest
totaling $2,140,777.03.14 The defendants moved for reconsidera-
tion of the decision in light of the Supreme Court decision in
Virginia Bankshares. The court denied the motion for rehearing
noting that unlike the case in Virginia Bankshares, the minority
shareholders in the case before them were entitled to seek appraisal
rights under New York law. Interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision, the district court stated that "Virginia Bankshares expressly
109 Id at 2766 n.14.
110 Id It would seem that in all instances in which the majority is attempting to force
a transaction on the minority, a rational minority stockholder should always vote against the
transaction in order to preserve their appraisal remedies, however this assumes that all
minority shareholders are aware of their rights and that preserving their rights is more
beneficial than approving the transaction.
II Id. at 2766.
112 770 F. Supp 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
113 Wilson v. Great American Indus.. 855 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1988).
14 Wilson v. Great American Indus.. 746 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
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declined to address whether a cause of action, or causal link, may
still exist under § 14(a) for minority shareholders who forfeited state-
law rights by voting for the merger.""1 5 In filling the gap that the
Supreme Court left open, the court held that Virginia Bankshares was
not controlling law, and that plaintiffs may have been deprived of
their appraisal rights and equitable relief.
In Scattergood v. Perelman"6 the Third Circuit concluded that
"Virginia Bankshares's bar on nonvoting causation theories applies
to the claims in this case ....",, The court could not distinguish
between the argument rejected by the Supreme Court and the
plaintiff's argument that although the majority had the strength to
effectuate the freeze-out merger, they would not have done so had it
not been for the campaign of misrepresentation and misleading proxy
solicitation which depressed the price of the shares. Although this
case did not address the loss of state appraisal remedies, the court did
note that an exception could lie if "the majority's misstatement or
omission [had] caused the majority to forego an opportunity under
state law to enjoin a merger."'1
VI. CONCLUSION
Virginia Bankshares does seem to stand for the proposition that
"the proxy rules ... can no longer be relied upon to embarrass a
management that must make full disclosure into paying a fair price
to minority shareholders in a freeze-out merger."1 9  Virginia
Bankshares also "effectively curtails the ability of shareholders to sue
under the SEC's proxy rules for fraudulent proxy solicitations"'20
indicating that the apparent "hostility toward shareholder suits
expressed in Justice Souter's opinion could lead to a narrow
interpretation of the SEC's powers under § 14(a).' 2' This in turn
11 855 F.2d at 90.
116 945 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1991).
"17 Id at 625.
11 Id at 626 n.4.
119 Roberta S. Karmel. Shrinkage of Shareholder Rights Under Proxy Rules, N.Y.L.J.,
October 17, 1991, at 3.
120 Id
121 Id.
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has lead at least one observer to conclude that "minority shareholders
are all but foreclosed from enjoying a federal remedy for an unfair
freeze-out merger. 1 22 It seems unlikely that the SEC will be able
to promulgate any significant new rules to aid disgruntled minority
shareholders who are the targets of proxy solicitations that are
fraught with material omissions or misstatements. If any such rules
are promulgated, it is questionable how expansive a reading the
Supreme Court would be willing to give them. The original
protective intent which formed the impetus behind the enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act can now only be restored by Congress.
The legislature must see Virginia Bankshares as a call to arms and
must enact greater protection for shareholders under § 14(a).
Abram Finkelstein
122 Id
